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Abstract
In this thesis, we investigate the relationship between patenting activity and financial
constraints for a broad panel of Norwegian companies between 2009-2018. The research is
inspired by Hottenrott, Hall and Czaranitzki (2016).
Innovation is considered the key to sustained economic growth. It is however a commonly
held belief among economists that R&D investments, and thus R&D active companies, are
subject to financial constraints, in large due to asymmetric information. Facilitating for
innovation is accordingly an important issue for countries seeking to secure and increase
their future prosperity. A goal for the Norwegian government is to increase domestic
R&D expenditure to three percent of annual GDP, and it is thus relevant how financial
constraints in R&D active companies can be alleviated.
Patents have several characteristics that could make it an efficient tool for credibly
conveying information and thus mitigate the information asymmetry between innovators
and potential lenders or investors. Through a fixed effect regression model, we explore if
physical investments in firms with a higher degree of patenting activity are less sensitive
to internal liquidity.
The findings indicate that patenting activity does have a significant effect on financial
constraints in small companies. Similar results are not detected for the full sample, medium
or large companies. We do not find evidence supporting that the effect of patenting varies
with firm age.
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1 Introduction
Innovation has long been considered the key to sustained economic growth (Romer, 1990;
Schumpeter, 1942). The historical increase in living standards can predominantly be
attributed to innovation – particularly since the Industrial Revolution. In the latest
decades, the significance of innovation has been reinforced by globalization, rapid advances
in new technologies as well as the deindustrialization of developed countries (OECD, 2007).
Facilitating for innovation is a fundamental challenge for countries seeking to secure and
increase their future prosperity (OECD, 2015).
As Norway aims to move away from petroleum and shift towards a knowledge-based
economy, developing domestic innovative capabilities is essential (NOU2016:3, 2016). In
2019 approximately 2.15 percent of the Norwegian gross domestic product was invested in
research and development (R&D). This is lower than for all the other Nordic countries,
as well as the OECD average (OECD, 2021). The biggest differences are observed in
investments performed by the private sector. The Norwegian government does accordingly
have an ambition to increase the domestic R&D intensity. In line with the EU, the target
is to raise overall R&D investments to three percent of annual GDP (Norwegian Ministry
of Education and Research, 2018). In order to achieve this goal, there is still a need for
growth. Exploring tools and strategies that could stimulate Norwegian R&D expenditure
is therefore of utmost interest.
It is a commonly held belief among economists that R&D investments are subject to
financial constraints. One of the main causes for this is imperfections in the capital market,
where information about the new invention is held asymmetrically between the inventor
and potential lenders or investors (Hottenrott et al., 2016). This creates a challenge when
assessing the quality of R&D projects, and obtaining credible information might present
a substantial acquisition cost. Additionally, R&D projects often have a low collateral
value, which increases the financial risk taken on by the lender or investor. Together
these factors raise the cost of obtaining external capital for R&D active companies, in
certain cases even to a degree where it is unavailable (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988;
Hottenrott et al., 2016).
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Long (2002) suggests that patenting can mitigate this informational asymmetry. Instead of
viewing patents merely as an instrument of privatizing information, one could argue that
it is also an effective tool to credibly convey information. Patents and patent applications
include detailed descriptions of the new technology, which generally will be approved or
have been given a first assessment by an Intellectual Property Office. This is valuable
and verifiable information to potential lenders and inventors, available at a relatively
low acquisition cost. Furthermore, if market actors believe that patents are correlated
with difficult-to-observe firm attributes, patents may work as a signal of said attributes.
If patents do contribute to mitigating information asymmetries, it could also decrease
the cost of external capital. This is the fundament of the theory that patenting activity
contributes to alleviating financial constraints.
A multitude of studies have investigated the link between financial constraints and patents.
Yet, the research is mostly conducted on start-up companies, and particularly in the
context of venture capital. These studies predominantly find evidence that a relation
between patents and financing does exist at an early stage. Similar research on companies
beyond the start-up stage is however still limited, and especially so in a European context.
Hottenrott et al. (2016) researched the phenomenon in established companies in the
Flemish part of Belgium. They found evidence that patents do attenuate financial
constraints on R&D investments also on a sample of more mature firms, but only for the
smaller companies.
We want to investigate if a similar relationship may be established in a broad sample of
Norwegian companies. We therefore aim to answer the following research question:
Does patenting activity affect financial constraints in Norwegian companies?
Our objective is to contribute to the research on the value of patenting, particularly
for Norwegian firms. If patents help alleviate financial constraints they could work as a
valuable tool in increasing R&D expenditure and thus promote innovation in several ways.
To our knowledge similar analyses have neither been conducted in Norway nor in a Nordic
country.
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Norwegian regulations regarding patent and accounting data allow us to analyse an
especially broad range of companies. The sample includes firms of all sizes, from a wide
range of industries. We investigate a panel of 1224 Norwegian companies in the period
2009-2018. Through a fixed-effect model, we study how physical investment’s sensitivity
to internal liquidity responds to patenting activity.
The findings of the analysis indicate that a higher presence of prior patenting activity in
small companies leads to less reliance on internal liquidity in order to invest. This implies
that their patenting activity alleviates financial constraints. We have not found evidence
for similar effects in medium or large companies. When analysing the effect of age we do
not detect a significant effect of patenting activity on financial constrain in neither of the
age subsets.
The current paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides an outline of the Norwegian
patent system, a theoretical background to the research question and the methodology, as
well as a brief introduction to prior empirical evidence on the research field. In section 3
the hypotheses that will be investigated in the study are introduced. Section 4 presents
the applied data, its origin, and how it is processed. Section 5 describes the econometric
framework and methodical approach of the analysis. In section 6 the results are presented.
In section 7 the implications and limitations of the findings are discussed. Finally, in
section 8 we make the concluding remarks by summarizing the thesis’s main themes.
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2 Background
The following section provides a theoretical background to the research question. We
begin with defining patents and describing the Norwegian patent system. This is followed
by a description of how we define and measure financial constraints. Next, we discuss why
R&D and R&D-active firms may be subject to financial constraints. Furthermore, the
concept of patents as an instrument to alleviate information asymmetries is introduced.
Conclusively, we give a brief introduction to prior empirical evidence on the relation
between patents and financing.
2.1 Patents and the Norwegian patent system
A patent is a documented exclusive right granted for an invention (Altinn, 2020). Patents
thereby provide an exclusive right to explore an invention commercially and prevent
competitors from producing, importing or selling the patented technology. This could
create the foundation for a competitive advantage. The protection is however timebound
and restricted to the nations where the patent was obtained. The rights of the patent owner
are also conditioned on public disclosure of the invention. The disclosure is intended to
increase the technological knowledge available to the general public, which could encourage
and stimulate further innovation (Seymore, 2010). Traditionally, patents function has
accordingly been understood as disclosure of information in exchange for protection (Long
2002).
Act No. 9 of December 15, 1967 on patents (The Norwegian Patents Act) constitutes the
legislative framework for patents in the Norwegian law. For an invention to be eligible for
patenting, it has to provide a technical solution to a problem. The solution has to be new,
represent an inventive step and show industrial applicability. One cannot be granted a
patent without explaining or showing how the invention can be implemented in practice
(NIPO, 2016; The Norwegian Patents Act, 1967). The protection is generally limited
to a maximum of twenty years from the filing date. In the Norwegian system, you will
receive a first assessment of the technology’s patentability within 7 months, and the patent
application is made publicly available 18 months after the filing date. It usually takes 1-2
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years from when you receive the first assessment until the patent may be approved. If
the patent is granted, the patent owner has to pay a yearly contingent to maintain their
exclusive rights (NIPO, 2020a).
There are several different approaches to obtain a patent in Norway. The first possibility
is to apply directly through the Norwegian Industrial Property Office (NIPO). It is also
possible to apply through the Patent Corporation Treaty (PCT), where the applicant can
apply to several countries simultaneously. PCT cannot grant a patent, but will forward
the applications to the relevant national intellectual property offices, where decisions are
made independently (NIPO, 2017). As of 2008, Norway is also a part of the European
Patent Convention, where an applicant can apply through the European Patent Office
(EPO) for patent rights in several member countries. The patent will be processed, and if
eligible, approved centrally by the EPO (NIPO, 2020b).
In 2019 the NIPO received 752 patent applications from Norwegian companies. This
represents a reduction by 12.8 percent from the number of applications in 2015, with
the number declining almost every year (The Research Council of Norway, 2020). This
could be due to more Norwegian applicants choosing to apply through the EPO, or fewer
patents being forwarded from the PCT. The NIPO has however stated that the Norwegian
applicants predominantly apply directly through the national system, but that the decline
could be partially due to natural fluctuations (NIPO, 2019, 2020c). Yet, there are in
general fewer patent applications and grants in Norway than in the neighbouring countries
(WIPO, 2020).
In a report from 2019, The Research Council of Norway questioned the declining numbers.
They argued that the number of applications should be higher, given that the workforce
of Norway ostensibly becomes progressively more competent over time. They theorize
that the reason might be that the companies preferred to protect their knowledge by
secrecy rather than by patents. Further, they refer to a survey conducted by Statistics
Norway (SSB), which revealed that of the Norwegian companies conducting innovative
activities between 2016 and 2018, 27 percent chose trade secrets as their strategy, while
only 7 percent applied for patents (The Research Council of Norway, 2019).
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2.2 Financial constraints
2.2.1 Defining financial constraints
Financial constraints are not a directly observable firm characteristic, and it is therefore
challenging to precisely define what financial constraints are and which firms that are
financially constrained. As a general concept financial constraint can however be defined
as frictions that prevent firms from conducting all desired investments due to lack of
financing availability or high costs of financing (Lamont, Polk, & Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
These frictions can include several factors, but according to Tirole (2006, p. 238) mainly
arise due to information asymmetries between the firm and external capital sources.
Tirole’s description of financial constraints has roots in the pecking order theory of capital
structure, introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984). The theory claims that firms prefer
internal financing over external. The hierarchy is based on the capital costs associated
with the different financing sources, due to information asymmetries and adverse selection.
It is assumed that managers know more about the company than potential investors and
that they act in the interest of existing shareholders.
The theory implies that if the manager acts in accordance with the assumptions, new
equity can only be issued if it is not at a disadvantage for the existing shareholders.
Consequently, if new stocks are issued it signals to potential investors that the manager
considers the company stock to be overvalued. Anticipating this, the company may refrain
from issuing new stocks, even for projects with a positive net present value. This creates
an adverse selection problem for potential investors, which will raise the risk premium.
According to the pecking order theory acquiring debt would offer a lower capital cost
than equity, but higher than retained earnings, which means that acquiring any external
capital will have an additional cost to internal capital. This will lead to a “wedge” between
the capital cost of internal and external capital. The size of the wedge represents the
magnitude of the financial constraints the firm faces.
2.2 Financial constraints 7
Figure 2.1: Wedge between internal and external cost of capital
Notes: The graph to the left shows the “wedge” in internal and external cost of capital for
a more financially constrained firm. The ec(k)-line symbolizes the cost of external capital
the ic(k)-line symbolizes the cost of internal capital. The graph on the right shows the
same for a less constrained firm (Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist, 2016)
2.2.2 Measuring financial constraints
Empirically identifying the presence and magnitude of financial constraints on a firm-level
has proven to be problematic. This has led to several different approaches and extensive
debate among researchers on the validity of the different approaches. As noted by Carreira
and Silva (2012), it is hard to pinpoint a superior approach as each method comes with
advantages and disadvantages.
One of the earliest and most influential approaches to measuring financial constraints
are investment cashflow sensitivity models. In their seminal paper on the topic, Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) propose a method for measuring and comparing the degree
of financial constraints a firm is subject to. The approach builds on the q-theory of
investment suggested by Tobin (1969). The q-theory argues that a value maximising firm
will continue to invest in physical capital as long as the marginal replacement value of
the existing physical capital is lower than the market value of the firm. Fazzari et al.
(1988) substituted the unobservable marginal Tobin’s q for average Tobin’s q, following
Hayashi (1982), and added cash flow to adjust for market imperfections. The degree
of investment sensitivity to cash flow would consequently function as a measure of the
financial constraints a firm is facing in an imperfect market.
8 2.2 Financial constraints










)i,t 1 + ui,t (2.1)
Where IK is the investment to physical capital ratio, q is average Tobin’s q which controls
for the firm’s investment opportunities and CFK is the cashflow to physical capital ratio.
Fazzari et al. (1988) verified the model by studying American manufacturing firms’
investment sensitivity to cashflow. Using a comparative approach, they found a stronger
correlation between investment and cashflow for the firms they deemed more likely to be
financially constrained. They created four subsets based on the firms’ dividend pay-out
behaviour. The rationale for subsetting the companies based on dividend pay-outs was
that if firms were financially constrained, having a large “wedge” between external and
internal capital, they would be withholding dividends to increase internal capital.
The cashflow sensitivity approach of defining financial constraints has in later studies
been employed and adapted to several different countries and contexts, as well as used
with various splitting criteria. It has become the most common way to define financial
constraints (Carreira & Silva, 2010). However, one of the major drawbacks of the model is
that one has to have access to accurate market valuations of the firms’ capital to compute
average Tobin’s q. Using the method on firms that are not listed on the stock exchange
therefore requires adjustment and other control variables. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)
use sales growth to catch some of the same effects as Tobin’s q, an approach adopted in
several following papers.
The cashflow sensitivity method has also received criticism on several of its key aspects
and assumptions. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) remarked on how the curvature of the
external capital cost line is unknown. They also questioned the dividend pay-out splitting
criteria used by Fazzari et al. (1988). The validity of substituting marginal Tobin’s q
for average Tobin’s q has also been discussed. In the case that the average Tobin’s q
does not fully reflect the investment opportunities of the firm, cashflow itself might reveal
additional information about the firm and capture this in the model. Alti (2003) found
that in a financially frictionless model, after fully correcting for firms’ q, the results still
showed significant investment cashflow sensitivity. This indicates that Tobin’s q cannot
fully capture a firm’s investment opportunities.
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2.2.3 Measuring patents effect on financial constraints
Hottenrott et al. (2016) builds on the investment cashflow sensitivity model proposed
by Fazzari et al. (1988) and subsequent models investigating the relationship between
cashflow sensitivities and R&D. In their model cashflow is substituted by another internal
capital measure: working capital. To measure the influence of patenting they include a
variable of the accumulated stock of patent applications depreciated by 15 percent yearly.
Further, they implement an interaction term between the patent variable and working
capital. By using a Tobit Random effect model, they investigate if the presence of former
patenting activity can help companies alleviate their dependency on internal capital. The
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Where R&DK is the research and development investments to beginning of year physical
capital ratio. ln(PATSTOCK) is the logarithm of the variable depicting former patenting
activity. WCAPK is the working capital to physical capital ratio.
Debt
K is the long term debt
to physical capital ratio and ln(K) is the logarithm of physical capital. Zi,k is firm level
control variables.  i is the industry code dummies and  t is the represents time dummies.
The rationale behind using working capital instead of cashflow is based on Hall and
Kruiniker (1995). They argue that working capital better reflects the funds available
to the firm to make new investments. By retaining cash earnings, firms accumulate the
financial funds necessary to conduct investments. As opposed to cashflow, working capital
also includes values that can be converted into cash relatively easily. Therefore, it can be
used by firms to smooth investments in R&D and physical capital. Working capital can
consequently be seen as a stock of liquid assets rather than the flow of liquidity in the
firm.
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As Hottenrott et al. (2016) is inspired by the investments cashflow sensitivity model
some of the associated criticism will be applicable to their model as well. For instance,
the critique related to the use of splitting criteria for segmenting the firms into different
subsets, with assumed differences in the degree of financial constraints. To do this one has
to define cut-off points. If the relationship between financial constraints and the method
of division is non-monotonic, the placement of the cut-off points may influence the results.
Additionally, the firms can move across the segmenting variable during the sample period.
This can lead to challenges in creating suitable segmenting criteria (Silva & Carreira,
2012).
2.3 Financial constraints in R&D active firms
Although asymmetric information and financial constraints could be a problem for any firm,
there are some characteristics of firms engaging in R&D activities that potentially lead to
an increased likelihood for financial constraints. Firstly, R&D projects are characterized
by large and usually firm-specific investments with low collateral value (Hottenrott et
al., 2016). Furthermore, valuating R&D-projects is challenging. Current asset pricing
approaches are likely to fail due to the difficulties of capturing the uncertain expected
future revenue of R&D activities (Scellato, 2007). Obtaining credible information about
R&D-projects might therefore present a substantial acquisition cost. This can make it
both costly and challenging for outsiders to judge R&D-performing firms’ quality.
R&D-performing firms who seek financing will also have an incentive to exaggerate the
positive quality of a project to potential investors and lenders, which further exacerbates
the information asymmetry between the firm and potential investors and lenders. This has
several implications in the market for external financing. The mechanisms of asymmetric
information in equity financing are a well-known problem in corporate finance. As
explained by the pecking order theory, investors will believe that managers act in the best
interest of pre-existing shareholders and therefore only issue equity if they get a price that
overvalues the firm (Tirole, 2006).
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Although this kind of problem is mostly discussed for the equity financing part of external
capital, the asymmetric information between a lender and the firm might affect debt
financing as well. Without accurate information about the quality of the firm’s R&D,
lenders might choose not to lend at all or for the risk premium to reflect average project
quality in the market. The latter can result in a “lemons premium” for firms with above-
average projects (Leland & Pyle, 1977). There are also challenges related to collateral.
Banks and other lenders will commonly require some sort of collateral before being willing
to grant a loan. As mentioned, R&D investments are however generally associated with a
low collateral value (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011; Scellato, 2007). Overall, this could
make it challenging to obtain loans for R&D-active companies.
The challenges related to financial constraints may be especially severe for small and young
R&D-active firms. A smaller portion of these firms have publicly traded securities, and
their activities are less likely to be publicly available or reported in the press. This could
lead to an increased cost of information (Berger & Udell, 1998; Hottenrott et al., 2016).
Furthermore, small and young R&D active firms will typically have less physical capital
that could be applicable as collateral to back loans. It is also likely that small companies
in general request smaller loans than larger firms, increasing the lender’s relative cost of
obtaining information (Hottenrott et al., 2016). Additionally, young firms are dependent
on establishing a new relationship with the financial institution. In other words, they
are unable to rely on advantages associated with established relationships, that could
have been used to reduce information asymmetries and moral hazard problems (Berger &
Udell, 2002).
In summary, since the cost of external capital is expected to be higher for R&D-active
firms, financially constrained firms engaging in R&D are more likely to rely on retained
earnings to finance their activities (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011; R. Hall, 1992) This
will, in turn, restrict R&D efforts in firms with limited access to internal financing and
with potential R&D projects in need of financing. This could lead to otherwise worthwhile
projects being delayed, cancelled or postponed.
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2.4 The role of patents in alleviating information
asymmetries
In accordance with section 2.3 firms engaging in R&D-projects may be subject to financial
constraints. Patents could however represent a valuable contribution in mitigating the
information asymmetry, as discussed in Long (2002). She transcends the “simple view” of
patents as merely an exchange of public disclosure for legal protection and argued that
patents also are an instrument to convey information about the underlying innovation or
the patentee. Hottenrott et al. (2016) divide this effect into two groups.
The first rationale is that patents offer the patentee a credible way to convey information
about the invention to potential lenders or investors. Patents, as well as patent applications,
are required to include a detailed description of the invention and a patent claim, where the
scope of the patent is defined and specified. Patents thus include valuable and verifiable
information for potential lenders and inventors at a relatively low acquisition cost (Long,
2002). This implicates that also patent applications, which have not yet been granted
or denied, may have a value as they allow external parties to evaluate the particular
technology (Harhoff, 2009).
If the patent is granted, a patent office has confirmed that the subject matter fulfils the
requirements of a patentable invention. This entails that the invention has been through
a certification process, and a third-party has verified that the invention is new, represents
an inventive step to prior art and is suited for industrial use (Long, 2002). Even if the
patent is not yet granted or denied, in the Norwegian system it will within seven months
have been subject to a preliminary assessment of patentability (NIPO, 2020a). It should
however be noted that the assessment and grant given by a patent office is not necessarily
infallible and the true threshold to obtain a patent is a controversial topic (Hottenrott et
al., 2016).
Second, if market actors believe that patents are correlated with firm attributes that are
difficult to observe or measure, patents may work as a signal of those qualities (Hottenrott
et al., 2016). If a lender or investor assumes that companies with patents are more
likely to have higher productivity, R&D success or future value, the patent can work as a
means of conveying information about those attributes to the intended recipients (Long,
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2002). The signal thereby helps outsiders derive expectations about properties that cannot
be immediately observed. Patents may therefore have a valuable signalling effect that
can mitigate the information asymmetry between the patentee and potential lenders, or
investors (Hottenrott et al., 2016).
Several studies have shown that a relationship between patents and desirable firm attributes
does exist. A study conducted by Helmers and Rogers (2011) found that firms owning
a patent had a larger growth rate, while Hall, Helmers, Juster and Sena (2013) suggest
that there is a positive association between patents and innovative performance. Various
studies have also shown a positive correlation between R&D expenditure, patent stocks
and market value (Czarnitzki, Hall, & Oriani, 2006; B. Hall, 1999; B. Hall, Jaffe, &
Trajtenberg, 2005). This might lead to lenders or inventors extrapolating the future value
of a firm based on their patenting activity (Hottenrott et al., 2016). For a lender, an
especially important property may be the probability of a potential debtor going bankrupt.
Both Cockburn and Wagner (2010) and Mann and Sager (2007) found that owning patents
was positively correlated with the survival of the firms.
2.5 Empirical evidence
A number of studies have detected a positive relationship between patenting activity in
start-up companies and early-stage financing. Baum and Silverman (2004) found a positive
correlation between patent applications at the US Patent Office (USPTO) and venture
capital (VC) financing, but noted that the effect varies across industries. Interestingly,
they also observe that the effect of patent grants is smaller than the effect of patent
applications. On a sample of German and British biotechnology companies, Haeussler,
Harhoff and Mueller (2009) found that having submitted at least one patent application
reduced the time to receive a venture capital investment by 76 percent.
Mann and Sager (2007) researched the relation between patenting activity in software
start-ups and VC availability. They discovered a positive correlation between patenting
and several success measures, such as the number of financing rounds, total investments,
the ability of the firm to exit the venture capital cycle successfully, acquisition of late-stage
financing, and as mentioned longevity. They also observed that the size of the patent
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portfolio mattered less than having at least one measure of patenting activity. Hsu and
Ziedonis (2013) studied 370 venture-backed semiconductor start-ups and finds that patents
have the ability to signal quality to potential investors. This applies especially in the
early stages of financing when the patentee lacks credible means of conveying information
about the quality of the firm’s technology.
In the case of later-stage financing, there are fewer studies to rely on and the findings are
indefinite. Deeds, Dona and Coombs (1997) found no effect of patents in the capital raised
in the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) within biotechnology start-ups. Heeley, Matuski
and Jain (2009) found that patents only had an effect on the amounts raised in IPOs
in certain industries, based on how transparent the link between patents and inventive
returns are. They did for instance find evidence of a patenting effect in pharmaceuticals,
but not within information technology firms. The study of Hottenrott et al. (2016) did as
mentioned, look at the effect of patents on financial constraints in the Flanders. The study
found that patenting activity alleviates financial constraints in smaller firms, but not in
bigger companies. They attribute this to smaller firms being more reliant on external
financing. Additionally, they split the sample into companies over and under 25 years old.
The results showed no significant effect of financial constraints in either of the subsets.
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3 Hypotheses
Following the theoretical background as well as the research question, we have developed
a main hypothesis, supplemented by two subhypotheses. Firstly, patents and patent
applications have attributes that may make them a useful instrument to credibly convey or
signal information about the patentee or the underlying innovation to potential lenders or
investors. This implies that it could work as a tool to mitigate information asymmetries,
and by that lead to a reduced cost of external capital. With background in this reasoning,
the first and main hypothesis is:
H1: Companies with a higher degree of prior patenting activity will be subject to less
financial constraints, compared to firms with less prior patenting activity.
Furthermore, the effect of patenting activity may vary with particular company attributes
or properties. Literature suggests that for small and young companies, the information
asymmetries between the company and potential lenders or investors may be especially
severe. Consequently, the cost of obtaining external capital rises and they become more
prone to financial constraints, compared to larger and older firms. For the younger and
smaller companies, acquiring tools to credibly convey information could therefore be of
particular significance. Supplementary to hypothesis one, we therefore present hypothesis
two and three:
H2: Patenting activity will have a greater influence on financial constraints in smaller
companies, compared to larger companies.
H3: Patenting activity will have a greater influence on financial constraints in younger
companies, compared to more established companies.
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4 Data
In this section, we present and describe the data used in our research. First, we give
an introduction to our main data sources: patent data from the Norwegian Industrial
Property Office, and company information and accounting data retrieved from a database
constructed by NHH’s Centre for Applied Research. Next, we describe the construction
of variables and subsets, as well as how the dataset was processed and cleaned. Last, we
will present our final dataset through summary statistics.
4.1 Data sources
4.1.1 The Norwegian Industrial Property Office
The Norwegian Industrial Property Office (NIPO) provides data on publicly available
patent applications from Norwegian applicants to NIPO or PCT. EPO applications are
not included. The patent applications were matched up with organisation numbers as the
product of a collaborative project with Statistics Norway (SSB) and the Nordic Institute
for Studies in innovation, research and education (NIFU). From 2007 the NIPO maintain
a consistent match between patent applications and Norwegian organisation numbers.
The current analysis is therefore based on data from 2007-2018.
4.1.2 Database of accounting and company information from
NHH’s Centre for Applied Research
The database constructed by NHH’s Center for Applied Research (from now on denoted
as “The SNF database”) consists of accounting and company information for all Norwegian
enterprises and groups in the time period 1992-2018. The data is mainly sourced from the
Brønnøysund Register Centre via Bisnode D&B Norway (Berner, Mjøs, & Olving, 2016).
The database includes two main categories of datasets: accounting data and company
data, which are further divided into one dataset for each year. In this paper, we apply
data from both categories in the years 2007-2018.
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4.2 Construction of variables
In the following section, we will describe how the variables used in the analysis are
constructed. The main variables of interest are investment, patenting activity and internal
liquidity. Further, there are two additional control variables: debt and physical capital
stock.
4.2.1 Dependent variable
We use physical investments (I ) as our dependent variable. The variable is constructed
as the change in total physical capital from one period to the next. It is adjusted for
the depreciation of assets 1. The composition is displayed in the following equation:
Investment(I)i,t 1 = Physical Capital(K)i,t  (Physical Capital(K)i,t 1 Depreciationi,t 1)
The variable is based on physical investments, instead of R&D investments, due to the
lack of data on R&D spending. It is challenging to obtain non-anonymized firm-level
data on R&D expenditure. The approach of using physical investments is however not
unprecedented. Similar methods are for instance seen in Scellato (2007). Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994) reasoned that financing of physical investments for R&D-intensive firms
would be more prone to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. They elaborated
upon this by arguing that it would be inappropriate to view the firm as having access to
separate sources of finance for R&D and physical investments. Furthermore, based on
Schumpeter (1942) they reasoned that new knowledge must to some extent be embodied
in physical investments.
As our sample consists of a broad spectrum of firms, and not solely on companies
specializing exclusively in R&D, we expect this to hold true for many of the included
companies. Physical capital also has the advantage of strict and uniform accounting
practices and ease of valuation. We therefore believe physical investments are a robust
measure of investment activity. Consequently, we argue that physical investments’
sensitivity to internal liquidity is a relevant proxy for measuring the financial constraints
the firms of our sample are subject to.
1Adjusting for the deprecation of assets gives us a slightly inflated investment measure. This is
because the deprecation in the accounting data contains deprecation of both tangible and intangible
assets. Analysing our dataset the size of this effect does however appear to be minor.
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4.2.2 Internal capital
In several seminal studies where they measure financial constraints, cashflow was used as
a measure of internal capital. By the rationale presented in section 2.2.3, we do instead
choose to use the firm’s stock of working capital (WCAP) as our measure of internal
liquidity. The variable is based on the standard accounting definition of working capital.
We therefore construct the variable by subtracting the firm’s current liabilities from its
current assets.
4.2.3 Patent application stock
The patent variable is based on publicly available patent applications, rather than granted
patents. Building on the findings of Hauesler et al. (2009), Harhoff (2009) argues that the
information that is relevant for an investor or debtor is not reserved to the grant event,
and thus that the signalling value of patents is not contingent on the term that the patents
are granted. Hottenrott et al. (2016) also build their analysis on this rationale, and have
chosen to use patent applications as the foundation for the main patent variable. To include
the full potential effect of patenting activity in the analysis we have therefore chosen to
use publicly available patent applications as the basis of the PATSTOCK -variable.
Further, the variable is computed as a depreciated cumulative sum of a company’s past
patent applications. By depreciating the sum we place an emphasis on the most recent
patenting activity, while still capturing the impact of the patent application stock from
earlier years. The variable is defined as: PATSTOCK = (1    )PATSTOCKi,t 1 +
Patent Applicationsi,t, where   is a constant depreciation rate of 15 percent. The choice
of this depreciation rate follows the example of Griliches and Mairesse (1984, pp 339-374).
4.2.4 Control variables
In addition to our main variables of interest, we also include control variables. In the
foundational models identifying financial constraints using investments cashflow sensitivity,
Tobin’s q was used as a sole control for the future investment propensity. It was believed
that the variable summarized all relevant information (Chirinko, 1993; Fazzari et al., 1988).
However, it has later been shown that this assumption is problematic (Alti, 2003; Blundell,
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Bond, Devereux, & Schiantarelli, 1992). Further, the construction of an average Tobin’s q
requires accurate market valuations of the companies. As only 17 of the companies in the
sample are listed on the stock exchange, we cannot compute Tobin’s q for our dataset. We
therefore need to rely on other controls to capture the effect of firms’ future investment
propensity.
We use the beginning-of-year debt (DEBTt 1) as a measure of a firm’s balance situation
and its access to the debt market (Hart & Moore, 1995). Debt is defined as all long-term
liabilities expiring in more than a year. We also include beginning-of-year physical capital
(Kt 1) in order to control for possible scalar effects related to the size of the companies.
4.2.5 Lagging and deflating of variables
The accounting variables I, WCAP and DEBTt 1 are deflated using Kt 1. This is done
to reduce problems with heteroscedasticity in the sample (Fazzari et al., 1988). To address
the concern of simultaneity between our independent and explanatory variables we lag all
time-varying explanatory variables by one year. As debt and physical capital is already
lagged once to get beginning-of-year values, this entails that they will be lagged twice2.
The issues of heteroscedasticity and simultaneity will be elaborated upon in section 5.
PATSTOCK is also lagged by one year. This is done to ensure that the effect of the
patenting activity occurs before the potential physical investment, as the patent application
could be filed at any time during the year.
4.3 Data preparation
4.3.1 Data merging
To conduct the analysis, we constructed a panel dataset using R Studio 1.3.1093 and
Stata 16.0. The company and accounting data were merged based on their organisation
number and year. To be able to implement the patent application data, we created a
data frame summarizing the number of patents the individual companies applied for
2The use of lagged variables shortens the time span of the analysis by two years. We are thereby
using data from 2007-2018 to investigate the time period 2009-2018.
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each year in the relevant time period. This data frame was further merged with the
accounting and company information based on their organisation number and accounting
year. All included companies have at least one patent application over the sample period.
This resulted in a dataset with 17 383 observations, 5599 patent applications and 2000
companies.
From the original patent dataset, 1565 patent applications were not matched with the
data from SNF. 1409 of these were applied for without an organisation number. The
remaining 156 patent applications seem to mainly be from companies that are not
subject to accounting obligation, such as firms organised as a sole proprietorship or as an
organisational section. Furthermore, 50 of the organisations that were included in the
dataset had a cumulative sum of zero patent applications over the chosen time period.
The problem seemed to arise for companies that applied for a patent within the chosen
time period but did not have available accounting data in the same years as they applied
for the patent. We chose to delete the relevant observations.
4.3.2 Data cleaning
The accounting data from the SNF database exhibit certain inconsistencies and unrealistic
observations. Additionally, not all companies in the database are relevant or applicable to
our research. It is therefore necessary to establish some conditions for the observations
and companies that are to be included in the analysis. First, companies have to make at
least one physical investment in the 10-year sampling period to be included in the dataset.
If they do not make any investments, they will not have any effect on the analysis and are
therefore redundant. Companies that have no revenue are also removed as they appear to
be inactive, making them less relevant for the analysis. This is in accordance with the
reasoning seen in the quality assurance of the database (Berner et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the observations cannot exhibit negative sales revenue, total assets or debt
values, since these variables exhibiting negative values would be illogical in practice. Note
that debt is presented as positive values in the database, so a negative debt value would
indicate positive debt, i.e., debt less than zero. The occurrence of illogical observations
might be due to errors in the database or varying accounting practices or strategies.
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We also remove companies with observations of zero physical capital. Our method is
dependent on using tangible assets as a deflator for other variables and it is therefore
not viable to include companies with zero physical capital. Last, each company needs
to be observed at least three times in the SNF database over the relevant time period.
This is due to two reasons. The first is that our panel data model controls for unobserved
heterogeneity, and we do thus require more than one observation. The second reason is
that the applied method requires lagging of selected variables. Certain variables are even
lagged twice, which leads to the specific condition of three observations.
After eliminating the data that does not meet the established conditions, as well as missing
values in the relevant variables, our final data sample consists of 8191 observations, 1224
companies and 2923 patent applications. How many observations that were removed in
each step of the cleaning process is exhibited in appendix A1.
4.3.3 Outliers
When examining our dataset with the constructed variables, we discovered there were
several outliers. There are two main reasons to this. First, even after cleaning the data, a
few singular observations exhibited unreasonable values. This is probably due to errors in
the SNF database.
Moreover, the creation of ratio variables leads to a portion of extreme values. We for
instance observe that this happens to the investment variable for certain companies
with peculiarly small physical capital stocks. Some investments in physical capital, that
arguably are not large, will obtain a large investment ratio value if the original physical
capital stock is extremely small. The consequence is that the methodology is a source of
extreme outliers. In order to minimize the influence of the extreme values, we winsorized
the ratio variables at a 90 percent level. This entails that observations larger than the
95th percentile are set to the value of the 95th percentile, and the observations smaller
than the 5th percentile are set to the value of the 5th percentile. We choose to do this
instead of trimming the data, as we believe that the observed growth to some extent
is valid. However, if not winsorized the observations would have an unreasonably large
influence due to the use of ratios.
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4.4 Construction of subsets
4.4.1 Size classifications
To investigate hypothesis two, we classify the companies based on their size. There are
three different categories: small, medium, large. The class for each company is based on
their size in the last year they appear in the dataset. The conditions to fall within each
of the categories are based on the classifications created by Orbis Global Database from
Bureau van Dijk. The Orbis database originally has four categories, including “very large”.
However, since only approximately 28.5 percent of the dataset falls within the “very large”
or “large” classification, we have chosen to combine these categories.
To be classified as “large” the company has to fulfil at least one of the following conditions:
• Operating revenue has to be larger or equal to 10 million EUR.
• Total assets have to be larger or equal to 20 million EUR.
• The number of employees has to be larger or equal to 150.
To be classified as “medium” the company has to fulfil at least one of the following
conditions:
• Operating revenue has to be larger or equal to 1 million EUR.
• Total assets have to be larger or equal to 2 million EUR.
• The number of employees has to be larger or equal to 15.
If the company is not included within one of the mentioned categories it will be classified
as “small” (Orbis, n.d.). A simplified conversion rate of 10 NOK per 1 EUR has been
applied. How the sample is distributed between the size subsets is exhibited in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of size categories
Nr. of observations Percentage Nr. of companies
Small 2,303 28.1 % 449
Medium 3,504 42.8 % 487
Large 2,343 28.6 % 279
NA 41 0.5 % 9
Sum 8,191 100% 1,224
4.4.2 Age classifications
To investigate hypothesis three, we create an AGE -variable. The variable is calculated by
extracting the year of establishment from the year of the observation. We classify the
companies that are older than 10 years as established, and the companies with age less
than or equal to 10 years are classified as young. Since the companies are divided by the
age in each observation, they can change category during the time span of the sample
period. The same company can thus be categorized first as young and later as established.
The distribution of observations in the age subsets is presented in table 4.2.





Age <= 10 2,941 35.9 % 733
Age > 10 5,250 64.1 % 812
Sum 8,191 100%
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4.5 Descriptive statistics
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics of relevant variables
Table 4.3 exhibits descriptive statistics for relevant variables in the full sample. The
companies are on average 18.03 years old, with 158.4 employees. The median for employees
is however only 19, indicating that half of the observations are of companies with 19 or
fewer employees. On average the companies apply for 0.36 patents every year and hold a
depreciated patent application stock of 1.66.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics full sample
Full sample: 8191 observations, 1224 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 18.03 14.00 14.99 2.00 113.00
Employees people 158.40 19.00 799.61 0.00 20,179.00
Patent applications count 0.36 0.00 1.41 0.00 31.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 0.87 0.23 1.62 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
573,519.00 2,767.00 9,053,337.00 1.00 270,864,000.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 1.66 0.72 5.32 0.00 101.98
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 11.32 1.79 24.44 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 4.03 0.68 8.64 0.00 35.54
Table 4.4 displays descriptive statistics divided into the size subsets. Naturally, age and
physical capital are on average higher for the larger companies, compared to the smaller
companies. The larger companies do also on average have a higher amount of patent
applications per year and a larger depreciated patent application stock. These variables
appear to increase gradually with each size subset. The maximum and minimum values
for several of the ratio variables are equal for all subsets due to winsorizing.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics size subsets
Small companies: 2303 observations, 449 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 12.17 10.00 8.29 2.00 54.00
Employees people 4.93 3.00 5.55 0.00 74.00
Patent applications count 0.17 0.00 0.45 0.00 5.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 0.85 0.08 1.73 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
1,328.00 312.00 2,948.40 1.00 42,641.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 0.78 0.61 0.41 0.00 13.55
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 11.42 1.65 24.36 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 3.65 0.39 8.33 0.00 35.54
Medium companies: 3504 observations, 487 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 16.90 13.00 13.55 2.00 100.00
Employees people 29.85 21.00 31.08 0.00 255.00
Patent applications count 0.23 0.00 0.64 0.00 15.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 1.01 0.29 1.73 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
8,192.00 2,518.00 16,088.52 1.00 253,355.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 1.04 0.70 0.50 0.00 25.46
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 13.37 2.86 25.76 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 3.63 0.70 7.89 0.00 35.54
Large companies: 2343 observations, 279 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 25.65 22.00 18.66 2.00 113.00
Employees people 502.00 159.00 1,435.72 0.00 20,179.00
Patent applications count 0.73 0.00 2.43 0.00 31.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 0.67 0.25 1.26 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
1,991,365.00 60,791.00 16,846,598.00 1.00 270,864,000.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 3.44 0.85 0.89 0.00 101.98
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 8.20 0.82 22.09 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 4.91 0.84 9.79 0.00 35.54
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Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics divided into the age subsets. Contrary to what
one would expect, the younger companies exhibit a higher physical capital mean than
the established companies. When examining the data we found that this is due to a
subsidiary of Equinor established during the sample period, which has a large influence
on the average value. If we exclude this subsidiary the average physical capital stock
for young companies is 59 061 thousand NOK. The younger companies do on average
have a smaller depreciated patent application stock, but the average number of patent
applications every year is only slightly smaller.
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics age subsets
Young companies: 2941 observations, 733 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 6.44 7.00 2.40 2.00 10.00
Employees people 50.02 9.00 270.30 0.00 5,540.00
Patent applications count 0.33 0.00 1.18 0.00 30.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 1.06 0.27 1.82 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
791,501.00 978.00 13,322,243.00 1.00 270,864,000.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.00 67.05
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 12.19 1.72 25.90 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 4.27 0.65 9.06 0.00 35.54
Established companies: 5250 observations, 812 companies
Variable Units Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Age years 24.52 20.00 15.17 11.00 113.00
Employees people 218.70 31.00 971.96 0.00 20,179.00
Patent applications count 0.37 0.00 1.52 0.00 31.00
Ii,t/Ki,t 1 ratio 0.76 0.22 1.48 -0.05 6.63
Ki,t 2 thousand
NOK
451,407.00 5,356.00 5,332,543.00 1.00 262,675,058.00
PATSTOCKi,t 1 count 1.87 0.64 0.68 0.00 101.98
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 10.84 1.82 23.56 -8.86 95.23
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 ratio 3.89 0.69 8.39 0.00 35.54
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4.5.2 Distribution of observations
Figure 4.1 shows that there are approximately the same number of observations, and thus
also companies, in the dataset each year. There is an average of 819 observations per
year. Plot 4.2 reveals that the number of patent applications per year in the dataset is
also relatively stable over the 10-year period. It is highest in 2009 with 320 applications

































Patent applications per year
Figure 4.2: Number of patent applications per year
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In plot 4.3 we see that most of the companies have data for the entire period of 10 years.
There are however some companies where there only has been accounting data available
for a portion of the years. This is likely because the company has become subject to
account obligations during the period, or the company has gone out of business during
the period, for instance due to bankruptcy. There are also companies where individual
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Figure 4.3: Number of observations per company
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4.5.3 Sector distribution
In table 4.6 the distribution of observations divided into industry groups is exhibited.
The industry groups are based on NACE codes. Specific information on which codes
that are included in the different industry groups can be found in the quality assurance
documentation paper accompanying the SNF database (Berner et al., 2016, p. 38). In
our dataset, data from all industry groups are included. This means that the sample
represents a broad variety of companies. However, companies classified as manufacturing
firms or general services are overrepresented when compared to the entire dataset of
SNF. Under the general services, companies classified as research companies are included.
We have fewer observations of real estate and service companies, as well as trade and
construction companies. These deviations from the SNF database are likely related to
which industries where patenting is a prevalent strategy or Norwegian peculiarities. For
instance, all Norwegian “borettslag” are categorised under the real estate and services
industry group.








1 Primary industries 1.71% 1.92% 0.21%
2 Oil/Gas/Mining 0.54% 3.69% 3.15%
3 Manufacturing industries 6.09% 29.10% 23.01%
4 Energy/Water/Sewage/Util. 0.86% 1.40% 0.54%
5 Building/Construction 11.20% 2.74% -8.47%
6 Trade 18.77% 9.66% -9.12%
7 Shipping 1.26% 0.70% -0.56%
8 Transport/Tourism 5.76% 0.91% -4.84%
9 Telecom/IT/Media 4.12% 5.95% 1.83%
10 Financce/Insurance 7.04% 1.58% -5.46%
11 Real estate/Services 26.57% 2.87% -23.69%




In this section, we will present the methodology of our analysis. First, we will introduce
the objective and potential challenges. Next, qualities and assumptions associated with
using a fixed effect model are discussed. Lastly, the model used in the current paper is
presented and described.
5.1 Objective and potential challenges
The goal of this empirical analysis is to identify if it exists a causal link between former
patenting activity and the degree of financial constraints a firm faces. More precisely, we
want to see if former patenting activity reduces investment sensitivity to internal capital
measured as working capital. We build the framework of our analysis around a method
proposed by Hottenrott et al. (2016). We choose this methodology for identifying financial
constraints and measuring patents’ potential effect on said constraints, because it allows
us to use a broad sample of Norwegian firms, not listed on stock exchanges. Hottenrott
et al. (2016) use R&D investment data from the biannual OECD survey, merged with
patent data and accounting data for firms in the Flanders. As mentioned earlier in the
thesis, we do not have access to similar records for Norwegian firms, meaning that we
need to modify the approach of Hottenrott et al.(2016) for it to be applicable to our data.
In the construction of the model, there is a risk of endogeneity, which could cause biased
estimations (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 86-88). A biased estimator is in expectation not equal
to the parameter of interest, which is the true coefficient, meaning that the point estimates
of the coefficients are systematically wrong in expectation.
To avoid endogeneity, we will be especially attentive to two factors. First, both working
capital and investment in physical capital are most likely correlated with the unobservable
future profitability of the firm. The unobservable future profitability of the firm is again
linked to a large set of exogenous and endogenous variables. Implementing methods trying
to mitigate the omitted variable bias caused by this and other factors will therefore be
necessary. The second factor is the possible problem of simultaneity between our dependent
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variable, investments in physical capital, and the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2013,
pp. 558-560). Feedback between these variables could lead to biases in our estimation,
and must therefore be avoided.
5.2 Fixed effect
5.2.1 Fixed effect estimation
To address some of the issues regarding omitted variable bias, we choose to employ a
fixed effect model on our data. As we have created a panel dataset, we can use panel
data estimation techniques to better control for the unobserved firm-specific effect. One
of the most widespread and used panel data estimation techniques is called within-group
estimation, also known as a fixed effect estimation (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 484-486). A
fixed effect model will control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics specific to
the firm. By time-demeaning all of the variables, all time-constant firm-specific effects are
captured in the term ↵i,t. It is thereby removing potential biases in the model stemming
from exogenous time-constant firm-specific effects. A fixed effect equation is exhibited in
equation 5.1.
yi,t =  1Xi,t + ↵i + ui,t (5.1)
Using the fixed effect model on an unbalanced panel dataset, like ours, is in principle
unproblematic, but as noted in Wooldridge (2013, p. 491), issues can occur if the reason
for the missing values i is correlated with the idiosyncratic error ui,t, as this can cause
a biased estimator. The reason for the missing i can however be correlated with the
firm-specific effect ↵i,t.
One of the potential downsides of using a fixed effect model is that it excludes a lot of the
variation in the data explained by variables fixed over the time period. For our analysis,
this will be variables such as industry group, geographical location and age of companies.
Even though age is not fixed for the companies over the time period, Wooldridge (2013, p.
488) notes that including variables that vary with the same amount for all groups over
time has no effect in the fixed effect model.
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By employing a fixed effect model, we can exclude exogeneity related to time-invariant
firm-specific effects. This is important, as if we were not excluding the effect specific to
the firm, we would expect our estimates to be biased. This is because the firm-specific
unobserved effect, for example managerial abilities, is likely to be correlated with our
variables of interest, like investment and patenting activity (Himmelberg Petersen, 1994).
5.2.2 Fixed effect assumptions
Three key assumptions for the fixed effect model are that the idiosyncratic error term ui,t
should be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in all periods, homoscedastic and
serially uncorrelated. The errors are homoscedastic if the variance is constant over time
and independent of the explained variable (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 51). They are serially
uncorrelated if the errors in one period are uncorrelated with the errors in other periods
(Wooldridge, 2013, p. 353). If these assumptions are violated, and not accounted for,
the estimated coefficients of the model will be inefficient, but not biased (Wooldridge,
2013, p. 509). This means that the test statistics and significance levels produced by
the model would be incorrect, since the correct standard errors are larger than what the
model calculates without additional specification.
One common way in literature and econometric analysis to deal with heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation is to use HAC-robust standard errors. This will adjust the downward
biased standard errors and allow for some serial correlation and heteroscedasticity within
groups. If possible, one would like to compute standard deviations and test statistics
under the weakest set of assumptions possible.
Due nature of panel data, there can be heteroscedasticity present in the idiosyncratic
error therms within firm. This can not be tested by traditional heteroscedasticity tests
like the Breusch-Pagan test (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 277). We therefore deploy a modified
Wald test for heteroscedastic error terms within firms(C. F. Baum, 2001). To test if the
error term ui is serially uncorrelated we will perform a Wooldridge test (Drukker, 2003).





The model applied to the analysis is presented in equation 5.2. The components will be
explained in the following segment.
Ii,t
Ki,t 1









+  5ln(K)i,t 2 +  t + ↵i + ui,t
(5.2)
5.3.2 Variables of interest and creation of an interaction term
As specified under section 4.2 the variables that are of interest to our analysis are: the
dependent variable physical investment to physical capital stock-ratio (Ii,t/Ki,t 1), the
explanatory variable working capital to physical capital stock-ratio (WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2)
and the depreciated patent application variable (PATSTOCKi,t 1).
Following Hottenrott et al. (2016), we take the natural logarithm of (PATSTOCKi,t 1+1)
before applying it to the model. This is due to the large skewness in the distribution
of patent applications. If the stock of patent applications is zero a logarithmical
transformation would create missing values. To handle this we add one to all companies’
patent application stock.
Additionally, we include an interaction term between (WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2) and
(PATSTOCKi,t 1). This is done in order to explore if the presence of former patenting
activity reduces the investment sensitivity to working capital. This variable and its
coefficient ( 3) will be the key to answering our research question. It is important to note
that by including an interaction term in our equation, we change the interpretation of the
coefficients to the variables included in the interaction term.
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5.3.3 Adding control variables
As mentioned, an important aspect in removing endogeneity from our model is to add
theoretically sound control variables. The fixed effect model controls for firm-specific
effects that are constant over time, such as industry group and origin region. In other
words, we do not have to take such variables into account.
As specified in section 4.2.4 the first control variable is the ratio of debt to physical capital.
This should capture the effect of the firms having high financial leverage and therefore
having problems getting access to the external capital (Hart & Moore, 1995). Our second
control variable is the physical capital, which is meant to control for firm size. This is
included because the size of the firm might affect their ability to raise external capital or
use economics of scale. As we expect the marginal effect of stock of physical capital to
decrease we logarithmically transform the variable to better fit the data.
5.3.4 Time-fixed effect
We include year dummies to capture the effect of exogenous shocks. These are disruptions
all or most firms are subject to, such as financial and macroeconomic shocks. Examples
include a change in interest rates, taxes or economic downturns. The time dummies are
added after the time demeaning of the model, meaning that the dummies have to be
interpreted as the difference from the base year, in our case 2009. This is often referred
to as a time-fixed effect, making our model a two-way fixed effect model with firm- and
time-fixed effects.
5.3.5 Model assumptions
In addition to the fixed-effect assumptions, there are two supplementary assumptions
associated with the model. First, the applied methodology for analysing patentings’ effect
on financial constraints is dependent on the assumption that financial constraints can
be measured as the firm’s sensitivity to working capital for physical capital investments.
If this relationship does not hold true, the method will not be able to inform us about
patents’ effect on financial constraints.
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The second assumption is that the relationship between patents’ role in alleviating financial
constraints and the segmenting variables used to divide our sample into subsets have a
monotonic relationship. This entails that when one variable increases the other variable
either strictly increases or strictly decreases (Clapham, 2001). If this assumption is




In the following chapter, we present the results of our empirical analysis. First, we describe
how to interpret the coefficients associated with our model. Second, the results of the full
sample are presented and described. Next, we examine the findings from the size subsets.
This is followed by the findings from the age subsets as well as the results from subsets
based on both age and size.
6.1 Interpreting the coefficients
Due to the use of semi-logarithmic functions, ratio variables, and an interaction
term, interpreting the coefficients of the model involves several factors to be aware
of. PATSTOCK and K are logged variables regressed on a level-dependent variable. They
must therefore be interpreted as follows: if the independent variable increase by one
percent, the dependent variable changes by  /100. Further, the variables for working
capital, debt and investment are measured as ratios. For the dependent variable, this
means that the effect of the independent variables is measured as the effect on the
investment/physical capital-ratio. PATSTOCK and WCAP are also integrated into an
interaction term, they can therefore only be interpreted independently if one of the two
are equal to zero.
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Table 6.1: Model estimates full sample
(1) (2)









WCAPi, t  1/Ki,t 2 ⇥ lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 -0.004*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.002)
Time-fixed effects included? Yes Yes
Modified Wald test 9.6e+36*** 9.6e+36***
0.0000 0.0000
Wooldridge test 151.81 151.81
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Observations 8191 8191
Adjusted R2 -0.037 0.118
Modified Wald test is testing for heteroscedasticity in the idiosyncratic errors. Wooldridge test is testing
for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The first step of our analysis is to run tests for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
We reject the null hypothesis for both the modified Wald test and the Wooldridge serial
correlation test. This implies presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic errors. The default standard errors can therefore not give us accurate test
statistics and significance levels. We must consequently use HAC-robust standard errors.
As exhibited in table 6.1 the coefficients remain unchanged, but due to the increased
standard errors, the significance levels are adjusted. We can for instance no longer point to
a significant effect on a 5 percent level for the PATSTOCK -variable (lnPATSTOCKi,t 1)
or the interaction term. Due to identifying heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the
residuals for all subsets, the following regression tables will be reported with HAC-robust
standard errors.
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Following column two in table 6.1, we see that the working capital-variable
(WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2) is significant at a 5 percent level. This means that the working
capital ratio of the prior year has a positive effect on the investment ratio in the current
year. This indicates that the companies’ investments are sensitive to the degree of internal
liquidity, and thus that they are financially constrained. However, due to the interaction
term, this effect can only be interpreted independently in situations where PATSTOCK
is equal to zero
The PATSTOCK -variable, exhibits a positive and weak significant effect at a 10 percent
level. A one percent change in the stock of patent applications one period ago leads to
an increase of 0,00103 (i.e., 0,01 * ) in the dependent variable Ii,t/Ki,t 1. This implies
that an increase in the number of patent applications leads to an increase in investments.
Yet, the variable must only be interpreted as an isolated effect in the case of zero working
capital. The interaction term between working capital and patenting activity is close
to significant on a 10 percent level with a p-value equal to 0.11. Due to the insufficient
significance levels, we can however not draw any meaningful conclusions on the effect of
patenting on financial constraints from these results. We do thus not find support for
hypothesis one in the full sample with HAC-robust standard errors.
For the control variables, we detect the expected effects. A higher value in physical capital
at the beginning of the prior period (lnKi,t 2) shows a negative and significant effect
on investments. Based on the assumption that a larger amount of physical capital two
periods ago is highly associated with a larger amount of physical capital one period ago,
this simply implies that investment will comparatively be smaller to physical capital if
the amount of physical capital is larger. For debt over physical capital (Debti,t 2/Ki,t 2)
we see that an increase in the debt ratio two years prior is linked to a small positive and
significant effect on the investment ratio in the current year.
Conclusively, we cannot find evidence that patenting activity in general makes Norwegian
companies less reliant on working capital in order to invest.
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Table 6.2: Model estimates on size subsets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Small Subset Medium Subset Large Subset
lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 0.103* -0.090 0.222** 0.099
(0.055) (0.109) (0.099) (0.079)
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 0.005** 0.007* 0.003 0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
lnKi,t 2 -0.447*** -0.465*** -0.485*** -0.385***
(0.034) (0.049) (0.049) (0.080)
DEBTi,t 1/Ki,t 2 0.014*** 0.019** 0.015** 0.007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
WCAPi, t  1/Ki,t 2⇥
lnPATSTOCKi,t 1
-0.004 -0.011** -0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Time-fixed effects included? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modified Wald test 9.6e+36*** 6.5e+36*** 1.4e+36*** 9.4e+31***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wooldridge test 151.81*** 138.84*** 36.142*** 0.84067
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3592
Observations 8191 2303 3504 2343
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.115 0.119 0.146
Heteroscedastic and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Modified Wald
test is testing for heteroscedasticity in the idiosyncratic errors. Wooldridge test is testing for serial
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
To test whether the effect differs between companies of different sizes, we ran the model
on the company size subsets described in section 4.4.1. The results are presented in table
6.2. The effect of working capital only exhibits significant results for the small companies
and the full sample. It does however only have a weak significance for the small subset,
with a p-value of 0.072. The coefficient for the small subset is however larger than for
the full sample. This finding might give some support to the rationale behind hypothesis
two. If the small companies are more financially constrained, the effect of working capital
should be greater than for the larger companies and the full sample.
For small and large companies, the coefficient of the PATSTOCK -variable is not significant.
For medium companies, the coefficient is larger than for the full sample and significant at
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a 5 percent level. This suggests that a higher patenting activity has the most prevalent
correlation to new investments in medium-sized companies. As mentioned, these effects
can only be interpreted independently if either the PATSTOCK or WCAP -variable is
equal to zero.
The effect of the interaction term is particularly interesting to our analysis. This is because
it measures how the influence of internal liquidity on investments varies with different
values of PATSTOCK. The effect is significant for small companies. Since the coefficient
is negative, a higher PATSTOCK -value would lessen the effect of working capital. The
findings are thus in accordance with hypothesis two, and partly hypothesis one. To
understand the outcome we examine the total effect of working capital on investments,







)i,t 1 ⇥ ln(PATSTOCK)i,t 1 (6.1)
The equation implies that if PATSTOCK and WCAP have values that are larger than
zero the effect of working capital would be reduced by the negative interaction term.
Furthermore, the effect of working capital would decrease progressively with higher
PATSTOCK -values. This suggests that a company’s investments are less sensitive to
internal liquidity if they possess a larger number of patent applications. It does accordingly
also have the reversed effect, where more internal capital would decrease the effect of
patenting activity on investments.
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Table 6.3: Model estimates for age subsets
(1) (2)









WCAPi, t  1/Ki,t 2 ⇥ lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 -0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Time-fixed effects included? Yes Yes
Modified Wald test 3.1e+36*** 4.5e+37***
0.0000 0.0000
Wooldridge test 220.28 108.15
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Observations 2941 5250
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.096
Heteroscedastic and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Modified Wald
test is testing for heteroscedasticity in the idiosyncratic errors. Wooldridge test is testing for serial
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We investigate hypothesis three by examining companies subset by age. The results are
presented in table 6.3. The group labelled as “young” consists of companies younger than
10 years, while the group named “established” consists of companies older than 10 years.
We do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial constraints in younger
firms are more influenced by patenting activity, as the interaction term is non-significant
for both subsets. Additionally, the findings only exhibit weak evidence for the effect of
WCAP in the established subset, and no significant results for the young subset.
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The results might indicate that there is no significant relation between patenting activity
and financial constraints for either of the age groups. However, the results may also be
affected by the lack of companies under the age of two, as this entails that our dataset
does not include the youngest companies. Additionally, there is a possibility that the
assumption of a monotonic relationship between age and financial constraints is violated.
This would entail that the placement of the cut-off points are influencing the results.
To further explore the relationship between financial constraint and age, we subset our
datasets containing small, medium and large firms based on their age. The results are
exhibited in appendix A2. We detect a significant effect of the interaction term for small
companies that have been operating for more than 10 years. This finding might be due to
the firm size itself being affected by financial constraints. We define company size by their
last year observed in our sample. Younger companies that do seek to expand by investing
in physical capital might therefore to some extent move to the medium-sized companies
within the 10 years of the sample. The younger companies that are left in the small
subsection after 10 years might therefore be companies lacking worthwhile investment
opportunities.
Summarized, the results for the full sample indicate that the included companies are
subject to financial constraints, but we do not get significant results for the interaction
term. Investigating the size subsets our results imply that small companies are subject to
more financial constraints and that patenting activity does alleviate financial constraints
on physical investments in these companies. We do not find similar results for the medium
or large companies. This supports hypothesis two, and gives partial support to hypothesis
one. For the age subsets, we do not detect results that support hypothesis three.
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7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the potential implications of our findings, both from a theoretical
and practical perspective. We also discuss the limitations of the paper, divided into
limitations associated with the dataset, and limitations of the applied methodology.
Lastly, we make suggestions for future research on the topic.
7.1 Implications of findings
7.1.1 Theoretical implications
This thesis contributes to the research field with evidence from a broad sample of companies
in a Norwegian context. The comprehensive range of sectors gives an interesting perspective
on the effect of patents in the economy as a whole, rather than limited to specific
industries. Furthermore, as the research on the effect of patenting on financial constraints
for companies beyond the start-up phase is more limited, it is particularly interesting that
the findings also include established firms.
Our findings indicate that patenting activity contributes to alleviating financial constraints
in smaller Norwegian R&D-active companies. This corresponds with the findings of
Hottenrott et al. (2016), and corroborates the propositon that the alleviating effect of
patents is greater in small companies, compared to larger companies. Due to differences
in the data availability and estimation methods, we do however want to be cautious with
comparing the magnitude of the effects. The findings also give support to the rationale
presented by Long (2002), even if only for the small companies.
We do not find evidence supporting the expectation that younger companies are more
likely to be financially constrained than established firms, or that patenting activity has
more influence on financial constraints in young companies. Our findings are however in
line with observations made in Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) as well as Hottenrott et
al. (2016). Nevertheless, our sample does not include companies under two years old, and
there is a possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between financial constraints and
age. This would entail that the placement of the cut-off points affects the results, and
that there for instance could be constraints for even younger firms.
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In regards to the underlying theory, that financial constraints affect smaller firms to a
greater extent then larger firms, we can not present conclusive evidence 3. The results
indicate that the companies in the small subset and the full sample are financially
constrained and that the constraints are greater in the small subset. This is consistent
with Berger and Udell (1998;2002) as well as Hottenrott et al. (2016). The small subset
does however only exhibit a weak significance for this variable. Since we do not find
significant results for the large and medium companies we cannot draw conclusions from
the results associated with these companies.
7.1.2 Practical implications
From a practical perspective, the findings could present new insights in the context of
increasing R&D expenditure. If patents help alleviate financial constraints on investments
in (small) R&D-active companies, there might exist opportunities in developing and
improving the Norwegian patenting system. As discussed in section 2.1, the number of
patent applications from Norwegian companies are decreasing, and a relatively small share
of Norwegian innovative firms choose to use patents as their intellectual property strategy
(The Research Council of Norway, 2019, 2020). The decreasing patent application numbers
could indicate that the benefits of applying for patents are not considered great enough,
compared to the effort and conditions accompanying patents and the application process.
Today, small companies are given some cost reductions when applying for patents. The
costs do however seem to be predominantly fixed, especially when also considering costs
associated with market research and development of the application (NIPO & Innovation
Norway, n.d.). It would therefore be natural to assume that the application process
commonly is comparatively more expensive for the smaller companies. If one would want
to raise the number of patent applications, there would likely be benefits from investigating
the possibility of making the process more accessible and less costly for small companies.
However, there might exist a risk of an unintended consequence: If patenting becomes less
expensive and more available, the signalling effect of attaining a patent could be reduced.
3In an alternate model specification we tried using cashflow instead of working capital as our measure
of internal liquidity. We did not find any significant evidence for a varying degrees of financial constraints
in the different firm-size subsets when applying robust standard errors. These findings are presented in
appendix A3.
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Denmark and Sweden both have a higher R&D expenditure to GDP ratio and a higher
number of patent applications compared to Norway (OECD, 2021; WIPO, 2020). The
similarities and differences in the patenting system of Norway and its neighbouring
countries may serve to enlighten us as to the effects of these structures. Conducting
an analysis on this topic may therefore provide valuable insight into why the current
differences in patenting activity exist, as well as possibly uncovering potential areas of
improvement for the Norwegian system.
In 2015, a law change made it possible to use patents, patent applications and licenses
as collateral against debt in Norway. Formerly, it had been possible to use patents as
collateral indirectly, but only as a part of the firms operating accessorises. The main
motivation for the change was to make it easier for businesses to obtain funding to develop
their invention (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014). One could argue
that these changes illustrate that the role of patents in alleviating financial constraints
has already been recognized to some extent. On the other hand, as of 2020, there were
only 66 patents owned by Norwegian companies registered as being used as collateral.
There could be several explanations for why using patents as collateral is scarcely done.
It may for instance be due to difficulties estimating the value of patents objectively or
challenges with reselling the patents in the case of bankruptcy (Harhoff, 2009). This
could indicate that the markets of intellectual property are not well-developed and still
immature. Accordingly, we might see this practice becoming more prevalent when moving
towards a knowledge-based economy. Harhoff (2009) argued that while the practice of
using intellectual property as collateral against debt is not yet widespread, it should not
be belittled, as it has «true potential and could make a major contribution in improving
overall conditions for innovation».
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7.2.1 Limitations of data
Although the aim of our analysis is to identify if patenting activity can reduce financial
constraints for Norwegian firms, the overarching economic matter is how to raise the level
of R&D expenditure. In regards to this matter, the most central limitation to our analysis
is the lack of data on R&D spending. We cannot with certainty claim that there is a direct
connection between financial constraints on physical and R&D investments. However,
due to the nature of R&D investments, it is natural to assume that if a company is
subject to financial constraints on their physical investments, there are likely also financial
constraints on their R&D investments.
With the available data, we are nevertheless not able to identify a direct relationship
between financial constraints on R&D expenditure and former patenting activity. If
we had access to data on R&D expenditure for Norwegian firms we would also have a
well-defined selection criterion to create a data sample with all R&D-active companies.
This would make it possible to approach the research question in alternative ways. We
would for instance have the option of comparing financial constraints in patenting firms
to financial constraints in non-patenting firms.
When working with accounting data there are some issues that might affect our analysis.
Accounting practices can change within firms and differ between firms. How a variable
is defined can thus vary over time and from company to company. This could create a
challenge if, for instance, a firm goes from submitting their financial report in accordance
with the Norwegian accounting standard to reporting under the IFRS system. The
same accounting variable could therefore be defined differently over time. Accounting
variables and identities are also susceptible to the firm’s overall business strategy, for
example in regards to pay-out policies, size of cash holdings and inventory. There is a
possibility that our analysis is subject to biases related to this. This problem will to
some extent be mitigated by the use of a fixed effect model, where the effects constant
for the individual firms over time are removed. This will however not eliminate potential
alterations occurring within a company during the sample period.
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The analysis is also limited to patents applied for in Norway, as data on Norwegian
companies filing for patents abroad is not included. This entails that the effect of foreign
patents on financial constraints is not captured in the analysis. Another potential drawback
is related to business groups. We have observed that for certain business groups the
economic activity predominantly occurs in another company than the one that files for
the patent. Under these circumstances, one firm will have rights to the patent, but
have a separate subsidiary company where the actual economic activity takes place. In
these cases, we will not be able to link the relationship between the patent and potential
financial effects.
7.2.2 Limitations of estimation method
The applied estimation method is subject to several limitations. Because of the complex
nature of firm investment behaviour, we cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity in our
model. We have aimed to reduce the endogeneity stemming from simultaneity and omitted
variable bias. Due to the intertemporal nature of firms’ physical investment strategy, the
applied lagging of the explanatory variables might not remove all simultaneity. A fully
dynamic investment model or the instrumental variable approach as the one implemented
by Himmelberg (1994) or Scellato (2007) might therefore be preferable.
Another important aspect in removing endogeneity is to add theoretically sound control
variables. In the current analysis, the controls employed should capture relevant
information for the firms’ future investment propensity, and thereby reduce the omitted
variable bias for working capital’s effect on investments. We can however not guarantee
that the included control variables capture this information fully. An alternative would
be to employ Tobin’s q. Yet, as discussed in section 2.2.2 there is evidence suggesting
that the variable is subject to several weaknesses, and due to the lack of publicly listed
companies, it would not be applicable to our dataset 4.
Even if fully controlling for other factors in our model there are still some limitations
that might affect the findings. The first potential shortcoming is related to the use of
4Following Himmelberg (1994) we tried a model specification including sales growth as a control
variable. Due to varying accounting practices for sales revenue the construction of the variable would
lead to a potential loss of otherwise valid observations. As it turned out to have little to no explanatory
value in our model, we chose to not include this control.
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segmenting variables and the selection of cut-off points. A main assumption of the model
is that there is a monotonic relationship between financial constraints and the segment
variables. If this is violated the placement of the segmenting cut-off could influence
the results. Since we are not certain that the relationship between size and financial
constraints as well as the relationship between age and financial constraints is monotonic,
we cannot rule out the possibility that this affects our results.
Further, we conducted a log(1 +X) transformation on the patent stock variable. This is
unproblematic if the PATSTOCK variable is high enough, since log(X) and log(X + 1)
converges with a high X. This could on the other hand cause problems for low or zero
values of PATSTOCK, and may therefore influence the interpretation of the results.
There are also potential problems associated with the applied method of dealing with
outliers. In ordinary least square models outliers have a large effect on coefficients,
computed test statistics and are assumed to hold valuable information. In our case, it is
apparent that the outliers are predominantly caused by the creation of ratio variables.
We therefore find it unlikely that the magnitude of the majority of these extreme values
provides relevant information within the framework of our analysis. Winzorising lets us
retain information about the growth, while mitigating the vastness of the observations.
The risk is however that the winzoring affects the validity of our coefficients and test
statistics, as the sample potentially no longer reflects the population.
Lastly, there is a risk of reverse causality, where the financial constraints a firm is subject
to affects the size of the firm. Interpreting a causal link between the segmenting variable
and financial constraints can therefore be problematic. As our analysis aims to identify
the degree to which patenting activity reduces financial constraints for the subsets by




For future research, it would be particularly interesting to conduct a similar analysis on
Norwegian R&D expenditure data. This would open new possibilities for how to investigate
the research topic, as well as potentially validating the findings of the current study. There
is however a scarcity of such data, especially on a non-anonymized firm-level. Studies
like Hottenrott et al. (2016) have nonetheless been able to obtain R&D expenditure data
from the OECD R&D-survey, even though these data are not usually available to external
researchers.
Furthermore, including even younger companies in the sample could give a more
comprehensive picture of the relationship between financial constraints, patenting and age.
Another potential path of progression would be to investigate patenting’s effect across
sectors. How common it is to patent seems to vary between industries, and it would
therefore be interesting to investigate whether patenting’s effect on financial constraints
also varies across industries, and if so, what factors that contribute to this.
To analyse whether the increase in external financing comes in the form of equity or
debt financing would also be relevant. It could be interesting to investigate if the effect
of patenting is strongest towards investors or debtors. This could also contribute to
illuminate the potential of patents as collateral against debt, as the adoption of this
practice still is limited in Norway. Within this topic, one could also construct a natural
experiment exploring if the law change in 2015 had any significant effect on the degree to
which patentees secure debt financing.
In our paper, we do not attempt to distinguish between the value of the inherent patented
technology and the signalling value of applying for the patent. If one could assess the
quality of the patented technology one might be able to disentangle the influence of the
separate factors. Hottenrott et al. (2016) attempted to make such a separation by rating
the quality of the patents based on the number of forward citations. Such an approach
might be adaptable to a Norwegian context.
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8 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate patents’ effect on financial constraints for a
sample of Norwegian companies in the period between 2009 and 2018. The fundament of
the analysis was the following research question: Does patenting activity affect financial
constraints in Norwegian companies? Based on the research question and theoretical
background, we develop three hypotheses. The main hypothesis was: Norwegian companies
with a higher degree of prior patenting activity will be subject to less financial constraints,
compared to firms with less prior patenting activity. This was supplemented with two
subhypotheses, concerning the size and age of the companies.
In order to explore the hypotheses, we applied a fixed effect regression to a panel consisting
of company, accounting and patent application data. Inspired by the method presented in
Hottenrott et al. (2016) we investigated how physical investments’ sensitivity to internal
liquidity varies with different levels of patenting activity.
The findings indicate that patenting activity does have a significant effect on financial
constraints in small companies. We did not detect similar results for the medium or
large companies. In other words, we find support for hypothesis two and limited support
for hypothesis one. We did not find significant results for neither established nor young
firms, meaning that there was no evidence supporting hypothesis three. Conclusively,
the analysis suggests that for small Norwegian companies a higher degree of patenting
activity alleviates financial constraints on investments. This corresponds with the findings
of Hottenrott et al. (2016), and offers support to the propositon that the alleviating effect
of patents is the most substantial in small companies.
Since the Norwegian Government has an objective to increase domestic R&D expenditure,
particularly with a need for greater investments from the private sector, we argue that
these findings provide insights of broad interest. If patenting does lead to an increased
willingness to invest in small R&D-active companies, facilitating for increased patenting
activity may have a positive influence on domestic R&D expenditure.
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Appendix
A1 Data cleaning progression
Table A1.1: Data cleaning progress
Data source Nr. of observations Nr. of companies Nr. of
patent
applications
NIPO dataset 7164 2109 7164
SNF accounting dataset 3,305,311 498,294 NA
SNF company dataset 3,294,379 496,665 NA
Data cleaning steps
1 Merged file 17,383 2,000 5,599
2 Removing PATAPPS=0 17,109 1,950 5,599
3 Removing companies
with investments or




with < 0 sales revenue,






















A2 Regression table age and size subsets
Table A2.1: Model estimates on age and size segmented subsets

















lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 -0.080 0.056 -0.317* 0.065 0.233 -0.049 -0.234 0.046
(0.129) (0.053) (0.178) (0.169) (0.216) (0.107) (0.156) (0.071)
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 -0.000 0.004* 0.001 0.008* -0.001 0.002 -0.011 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
lnKi,t 2 -0.518*** -0.399*** -0.502*** -0.378*** -0.511*** -0.442*** -0.475*** -0.353***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.084) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080) (0.173) (0.108)
DEBTi,t 2/Ki,t 2 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.001 -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2⇥
lnPATSTOCKi,t 1
-0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.014** -0.000 0.005 0.007 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Time-fixed effects included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.096 0.089 0.111 0.106 0.110 0.194 0.072
Observations 2941 5250 1216 1087 1301 2203 256 1553
Heteroscedastic and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
58 A3 Regression with cashflow as internal liquidity variable
A3 Regression with cashflow as internal liquidity
variable
In this appendix we show an alternate model specification where we deploy cashflow as
our measure of internal capital. This is in line with the with the seminal papers studying
financial constraints. Using cashflow as our internal capital measure we cannot find any
significant effects for the PATSTOCK-variable, the interaction term or for cashflow itself.
HAC-robust standard errors are applied.
Table A3.1: Model estimates on size subsets using cashflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Small Subset Medium Subset Large Subset
lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 0.055 -0.120 0.142 0.092
(0.051) (0.126) (0.088) (0.058)
CFi,t 1/Ki,t 2 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnKi,t 2 -0.493*** -0.509*** -0.525*** -0.433***
(0.018) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028)
DEBTi,t 2/Ki,t 2 0.005* 0.009* -0.001 0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
CFi,t 1/Ki,t 2⇥
lnPATSTOCKi,t 1
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time-fixed effects included? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8191 2303 3504 2343
Adjusted R2 -0.041 -0.109 -0.025 0.021
Heteroscedastic and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A4 Random effect model
In this appendix we will investigate if it is appropriate to use a random effect model
instead of a fixed effect model. One of the drawbacks of using the fixed effect model is
that it requires a large number of parameters to be calculated, which consumes degrees of
freedom. It would therefore be of interest to utilize a more efficient estimation technique
(Wooldridge, 2013, p. 484-486).
Instead of fully time-demeaning the variables, the random effect model only quasi-demeans
them. The model also rely on less parameters to be estimated and therefore consumes
fewer degrees of freedom, making the random effect model more efficient in estimating
coefficients. Due to the inclusion of some variation in ↵it the random effect model rely on
the assumption of strict exogeneity between the explanatory variables and ↵it, in order to
be unbiased and efficient (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 492-495).
To test the assumption of strict exogeneity we deploy a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2013,
p. 496). In contrast to random effect model the fixed effect model is unbiased even when
there is correlation between the explanatory variables and ↵it. We can therefore compare
the coefficient vectors of the fixed effect model and the random effect model. If they are
equal, we can apply a random effect model.
The Hausman test is presented in table A5.1 for the full sample and the subsets segmented
on size. All regressions are run and presented with default standard errors as robust
standard errors would cause the Hausman statistic to lose its chi-square distribution. As
the Hausman test finds a significant difference in the coefficients for the full sample and for
all of our size subsets. We can therefore not rely on a random effects model in our analysis.
This is in line with our expectations as it is natural to assume that the working capital
ratio, firm patenting propensity and debt ratio is correlated with the error term ↵it. This
is because ↵it includes a large number of observable and unobservable firm-characteristics









Table A4.1: Model estimates with random effect on size subsets



























lnPATSTOCKi,t 1 0.103** 0.166*** -0.090 0.042 0.222** 0.206*** 0.099* 0.090**
(0.052) (0.041) (0.133) (0.109) (0.094) (0.075) (0.059) (0.043)
WCAPi,t 1/Ki,t 2 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.003 0.003 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnKi,t 2 -0.447*** -0.205*** -0.465*** -0.310*** -0.485*** -0.383*** -0.385*** -0.230***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.043) (0.030) (0.032) (0.023) (0.028) (0.018)
DEBTi,t 2/Ki,t 2 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.007* 0.016***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
WCAPi, t/Ki,t⇥
logPATSTOCKi,t 1
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004* -0.005** 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 4.097*** 2.084*** 3.487*** 2.460*** 4.192*** 3.447*** 4.500*** 2.817***
(0.169) (0.102) (0.290) (0.218) (0.262) (0.201) (0.311) (0.211)
Time-fixed
effects included?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman test 249.32*** NA 50.29*** 131.51***
0.0000 NA 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 8191 8191 2303 2303 3504 3504 2343 2343
Adjusted R2 -0.037 -0.100 -0.024 0.030
Default standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
